The connections ran through particular factions and camps across Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. They began before the 1970s, expanded during that decade and continued into the early 1980s. Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine appear in the historical record as providers of training or support.
These organizations belonged to the Palestine Liberation Organization, but the relationships developed through different channels. Identifying the faction, recipient and date reveals more than treating the camps as a single operation. It also explains how militants with different political projects could draw on overlapping regional infrastructure.
The First Journeys Began in the Late 1960s
In his 2015 study, researcher Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya traces Turkish and Kurdish activists’ journeys to Palestinian camps from 1968. Drawing on memoirs and interviews, he identifies an early group trained by Fatah and later groups that traveled mainly to Jordan between 1969 and 1971.
Among the participants were Deniz Gezmiş and Hüseyin İnan, who became leading figures in the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey. For these militants, the trip combined ideological solidarity with preparation for armed struggle at home. Training was a practical objective, not simply an expression of support.
The geography changed as Palestinian armed organizations lost their Jordanian bases in 1970 and 1971. Lebanon became increasingly important. After Turkey’s 1971 military intervention, Palestinian networks in Syria and Lebanon also offered refuge to Turkish and Kurdish militants.
Kurdish Contacts Preceded Öcalan’s Larger Network
Akkaya distinguishes earlier Kurdish organizations from Abdullah Öcalan’s Kurdistan Workers’ Party. His research records Kurdish contacts with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1975 and training groups in 1976 and 1977. Later groups attended Fatah camps.
Öcalan’s organization established its Palestinian training connections in 1979, initially with the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The study places roughly 40 to 50 of its militants in Lebanon by the end of that year and almost 300 trainees between 1980 and 1982.
That sequence matters: the relationship began in the 1970s, but its larger phase crossed into the next decade. Akkaya argues that the camps helped the organization rebuild as well as acquire military skills.
The Armenian Connection and the Record of Material Support
Political scientist Michael M. Gunter’s 1985 study describes training and logistical links between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. He also cites reporting about assistance involving other Palestinian factions.
The broad statement that Palestinians supplied training, weapons and ammunition to leftists, rightists, Kurdish separatists and Armenians can be traced to a specific source. Gunter reproduces an account given by an unnamed senior Turkish officer to journalist Claire Sterling in early 1982. It is an attributed historical account, rather than a complete inventory of recipients.
Gunter also records denials of any organizational links or support by Armenian Secret Army representatives and by Palestine Liberation Organization official Farouk Kaddoumi. The evidence concerns particular organizations and contacts, not Armenians as a population.
Rightist Militants and Ağca’s Disputed Account
TIME reported in May 1981, citing West German authorities, that Turkish rightists sent followers to Popular Front camps in Lebanon. Ağca’s case was distinct. Associated with the Grey Wolves, he shot Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981. He claimed to have received Palestinian training and gave shifting accounts, including one placing it in Syria in 1980. A spokesman for George Habash denied any connection in comments to TIME, which reported no solid evidence of Ağca’s alleged journey.
What Turkey’s Death Toll Does and Does Not Measure
Sabri Sayari’s 2010 study places the toll from political terrorism in Turkey between 1976 and 1980 at more than 5,000 deaths. The figure covers violence involving multiple leftist, ultranationalist and separatist groups. It is not a count of victims killed by people trained in Palestinian camps.
Sayari’s assessment gives foreign support a role in the proliferation of armed organizations, while identifying domestic political and social developments as the principal drivers of the escalation. Training abroad strengthened capabilities within a conflict that also had deep roots inside Turkey.
Contemporary concern about the camps reached Washington. At a US Senate hearing on June 25, 1981, academic and former Turkish legislator Aydın Yalçın described reports of Turkish militants training with Palestinian organizations. His testimony is evidence of the concerns raised at the time, not a judicial finding about every allegation.
The historical picture is therefore one of intersecting militant networks: training, shelter and reported supplies moved across borders, while each organization pursued its own aims. The documented relationships are substantial enough to examine on their own, without turning Ağca’s disputed story into proof of who directed the attack on the pope.
